MA GUN LAWYER

Westbrook v. Pratt (2024)

This Massachusetts case of mine is a very significant recent challenge to the Massachusetts unsuitability standard. In Westbrook v. Pratt, the plaintiff, Westbrook, had his firearms license denied by the Holyoke Police Chief, Pratt, on the grounds that he was “unsuitable” due to past incidents that did not result in criminal convictions. I argued that the denial violated Mr. Westbrook’s Second Amendment rights and lacked Due Process. The District Court judge agreed with my arguments, finding that the law- G.L. c. 140, s131- is unconstitutional and violative of the Bruen decision.

Key Legal Arguments in Pratt:

• I argued in Westbrook v. Pratt that the unsuitability clause was unconstitutionally vague and allowed for arbitrary enforcement.
• I also argued that the denial occurred without a fair hearing or notice of the specific evidence against him, violating procedural due process, etc. The defense, on the other hand, maintained that the unsuitability clause was necessary for public safety and consistent with the state’s authority to regulate firearms.

Status (as of 2025):

The case is now pending in Superior Court, with motions on both sides addressing whether the unsuitability standard can withstand scrutiny under the Bruen framework. The courts eventual decisions may ultimately influence how Massachusetts and potentially other “may-issue” states can enforce discretionary gun licensing provisions.

Here is a summary of the recent hearing we had in Superior Court in the Westbrook case:

Summary of the Westbrook Hearing on Judgment on the Pleadings
Hampden Superior Court, March 5, 2025

1. Case Overview
   The case before the Hampden Superior Court involves Pratt v. Randy Westbrook et al. (24 CV 392), concerning a challenge to the constitutionality of Massachusetts’ firearm licensing suitability standard under Chapter 140, Section 131. The motion at hand is the plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and the defendant’s opposition. Judge Deepika Shukla presides.
2. Judicial Disclosure
   Judge Shukla disclosed prior interactions with the plaintiff, Chief Pratt, during her tenure as Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Springfield. She confirmed no conflict of interest but allowed parties to object. No objections were raised.
3. Procedural Context
   The parties reviewed filed documents, including:
   • Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
   • Defendant’s opposition.
   • The Commonwealth’s memorandum defending the constitutionality of Chapter 140, Section 131.
   • Defendant’s motion to report the case to the appeals court.
   • Joint opposition by the plaintiff and the Commonwealth.
4. Motion to Report to the Appeals Court
   The defendant argued that similar cases are pending and should be consolidated at the appellate level. The Attorney General’s office opposed, stating the appeals court prefers superior court rulings first. The judge leaned toward deciding the merits rather than reporting the case.
5. Plaintiff’s Argument for Judgment on the Pleadings
   Attorney Denegan (representing the plaintiff) contended that:
   • The district court’s reversal of Chief Pratt’s denial of Westbrook’s license was legally incorrect.
   • Bruen v. New York did not foreclose suitability requirements.
   • Westbrook’s past criminal charges (assault and battery, including against a pregnant woman) justified denial based on suitability.
   • The Massachusetts suitability standard aligns with other jurisdictions deemed constitutional.
6. Commonwealth’s Argument Supporting Constitutionality
   Attorney Groban (for the Attorney General) maintained:
   • Bruen did not invalidate suitability standards.
   • Massachusetts’ suitability criteria resemble Connecticut’s, which the Supreme Court referenced favorably.
   • The standard is not vague and provides procedural safeguards.
   • The appeals court previously ruled the standard is not highly discretionary.
   • The system allows for judicial review via a de novo evidentiary hearing.
7. Defendant’s Argument Against Suitability Standard
   Attorney Smith argued that:
   • Massachusetts’ law grants excessive discretion to police chiefs without objective criteria.
   • The process violates Bruen, which rejected discretionary licensing regimes.
   • Rahimi is inapplicable as it involved active restraining orders, whereas this case lacks judicial findings of dangerousness.
   • The judicial review process is not truly de novo but deferential to licensing authorities.
   • The standard should include clear procedural protections akin to sex offender registries.
   • Massachusetts remains a “may-issue” state rather than a “shall-issue” state.
8. Rebuttals and Judicial Considerations
   • The Commonwealth countered that the law provides a statutory review process and that suitability standards have been upheld in similar cases.
   • The judge questioned the variance in decisions across licensing authorities, suggesting potential vagueness concerns.
   • Attorney Smith argued that the standard lacks guidelines or criteria as to how the determination of “unsuitability” is to be made, violating Due Process and the 2nd Amendment.